"Stick or Twist?” : negotiating price and data in an era of conditional approval by Gladwell, D. et al.
This is a repository copy of "Stick or Twist?” : negotiating price and data in an era of 
conditional approval.




Gladwell, D., Bullement, A., Cowell, W. et al. (2 more authors) (2019) "Stick or Twist?” : 
negotiating price and data in an era of conditional approval. Value in Health. ISSN 1098-
3015 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.09.001





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
“Stick or Twist?”: Negotiating Price and Data in an Era of Conditional Approval 
Running title: Negotiating in an era of conditional approval 
Abstract 
Background: Changes in the regulatory context enable faster approval of transformative 
medicines. They also lead to HTA agencies having to make decisions with less evidence. In 
response HTA agencies have also initiated forms of conditional approval. When the evidence 
base for a new oncology treatment leaves substantial uncertainty, the new Cancer Drugs Fund 
allows the National Institute for Heath and Care Excellence to give the manufacturer two 
options: (i) offer a low price based on conservative assumptions and obtain immediate 
approval (“stick”); or (ii) wait until the evidence base has further matured before finalising a 
potentially higher agreed price (“twist”). 
Objectives: The purpose of this article is to explain how, using the theoretical framework of 
the expected value of sample information, simulation methods can help inform 
manufacturer’s decisions when faced with the option to “stick” or “twist”. 
Methods: We first summarise a general model to help frame the manufacturer’s negotiating 
strategy. We then use a motivating case study, based on a hypothetical immunotherapy, to 
illustrate how manufacturers can use simulation methods to robustly characterise the 
uncertainty inherent to further data collection and incorporate this uncertainty within their 
decision making.  
Results: Our approach allows us to estimate the commercial value of generating additional 
data (the difference between “stick” and “twist’s” estimated net present value). We test the 
sensitivity of the results to different assumptions via scenario analyses. 
Conclusions: This article shows that simulation methods can be used to help pharmaceutical 




 The changing regulatory and HTA context means it will be increasingly important to 
estimate the value of collecting further information. Expected Value of Sample 
Information (EVSI) provides a framework for this 
 To date EVSI has predominantly been applied from the perspective of the HTA 
organisation rather than the manufacturer. Our contribution is to use a motivating case 
study to explain how simulation methods can be used to estimate the expected 
commercial value of sample information 
 We show that the uncertainty inherent in collecting further data can be characterised. 








The context for the development, approval and reimbursement of new medical interventions 
is evolving rapidly. Companies are increasingly focussing on areas with high unmet need1,2. 
The development of immunotherapies, including the chimeric antigen receptor T-cell 
therapies, mean that some patients who would have previously been considered at the “end of 
life” may now have a prognosis similar to the general population3. This changing 
development landscape has been accelerated by changes in the regulatory context. For 
interventions addressing areas of high unmet need the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have launched initiatives to lower the 
regulatory hurdle4–6. Conditional, or accelerated, approval may be granted to these 
interventions to allow earlier access. Manufacturers then need to return to the regulators with 
further data in order to be granted “standard” marketing authorisations following re-
assessment4–6. 
Though the regulators’ increased flexibility may increase the speed with which patients can 
access “breakthrough” medications it will likely increase the competition for scarce 
resources7. Health Technology Assessment (HTA) bodies may have to make an initial 
assessment on a sparser evidence base8,9. Some bodies such as the Italian Medicines Agency 
(AIFA) have long been comfortable with the need to repeatedly assess the link between an 
intervention’s observed effectiveness and its reimbursed price10. Until recently many bodies, 
including NICE, have adopted a binary approach – relying on the evidence available at 
launch, to assess whether an intervention is an effective use of public funds. The re-launched 
Cancer Drug’s Fund (CDF) changes this for oncology interventions. Under the revised 
arrangements a new therapy may now be approved, rejected or approved with research. 
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When attempting to launch an oncology intervention a manufacturer now faces a more 
complex decision. Previously it could either de facto withdraw by keeping the price at a level 
the company knows is un-approvable within the cost-effectiveness framework, or reduce the 
price in order for the intervention to be considered cost-effective.  Now it can either: (i) 
withdraw; (ii) permanently reduce the price and access baseline commissioning (“Stick”); or 
(iii) seek approval with research with the expectation that the additional data supports a 
higher price (“Twist”). Into this context the recent DSU guidance by Grimm et al. provides 
advice to the NICE decision makers but how can manufacturers make informed decisions 
when faced with high levels of uncertainty11? 
Estimating the value of information 
Value of Information (VoI) methods provide an approach for assessing the value of further 
evidence collection 8,9,12,13. Changes in the regulatory context are likely to result in these 
methods having greater relevance for HTA bodies. However, HTA bodies will need to not 
only consider the maximum benefit that could be accrued from further research, the expected 
value of perfect information (EVPI), but also the expected value of information from concrete 
proposals for further data collection - the expected value of sample information (EVSI) 8.  
To date, there has been little consideration of how manufacturers can use VoI methods to 
address the commercial uncertainties they face in this era of conditional approval. The 
changing context increases the importance of considering the commercial value of collecting 
further information, and thus the rationale for ‘twisting’. In this paper we consider the 
commercial value of ‘twisting’ to primarily be captured through any increase, relative to 
‘sticking’, in the estimated net present value (NPV) - the time discounted flow of revenues 
associated with a strategy minus its costs). 
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EVSI provides a coherent framework for informing a company’s negotiating position during 
the reimbursement process. It enables the manufacturer to combine the divergent sources of 
information they possess in their different functions within one integrated analysis. We 
demonstrate how this analysis can be undertaken to identify the estimated NPV of a specific 
data collection plan (with limited patient numbers and a limited follow-up period). To 
increase clarity we illustrate our approach using a pertinent but hypothetical case study – an 
immune oncology therapy under assessment by NICE.  
Methods 
General model 
If a new intervention is initially judged by an HTA body to be not cost-effective the 
pharmaceutical company may: (i) lower the price permanently and get immediate approval; 
(ii) lower the price temporarily while collecting further data under “approval with research”; 
or (iii) abort their attempt to launch in that market. A range of factors influence this decision 
including: profit maximisation; relationships with key stakeholders; and the pharmaceutical 
company’s internalised values. In the face of this complexity we adopt an approach similar to 
NICE. For each of available strategies we formally derive an estimate for one dominant 
metric and expect the decision made to be informed by this metric but not determined solely 
by it. For the pharmaceutical company the single metric of greatest relevance is not the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) but the NPV of each of the potential strategies, 
i.e. each strategy’s expected time-discounted cash flow14. 
The methods we adopt are applicable in any value-based or outcome-based reimbursement 
setting. However, for clarity, we assume that the manufacturer is launching the drug in a 
market where cost-effectiveness analysis is the primary metric used by the HTA body to 
assess the value of the new intervention.  
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As such the HTA body can be assumed to decide to reimburse the intervention with the 
greatest net health benefit. Formally: 
                                              𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏  =   𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑 𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴(𝜆 𝑄𝑑 − 𝐶𝑑)                                           (1) 
where 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏 is the intervention the HTA body chooses to reimburse, 𝜆 is their threshold, the 
maximum cost the HTA body would be willing to pay for one QALY when coming to a 
reimbursement decision (under the assumption that the net monetary benefit maximazation at 
a given threshold is the only rule for acceptability). 𝑄𝑑 and 𝐶𝑑  are the quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) and costs estimated for each decision option (d) given the parameters (𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴) 
judged most plausible by the HTA body for each of the possible treatment strategies, and 𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴  denotes the expected (i.e. mean) value, averaged over the distribution of 𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴1. From 
here on, in order to simplify the notation we describe the method for a decision problem 
when there are only two options, the current intervention (option 1) and the manufacturer’s 
new product (option 2). The method extends naturally to more than two decision options. 
The company knows the decision rule of the HTA. To maximise revenue, the price (𝑃2∗)  is 
selected by the manufacturer at the highest they still achieve reimbursement, more formally: 
         
         𝑃2∗  =   𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃2 [𝑃2 × 𝐼 {𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴 (𝜆𝑄2 − 𝐶2(𝑃2)) >  𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴(𝜆𝑄1 − 𝐶1)}]                     (2) 
where I (A > B) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if A is greater than B, and zero 
otherwise.  
                                                 






We call 𝑃2∗ the economically justifiable price (EJP) – the maximum at which the mean ICER, 
based on the HTA body’s belief concerning their specification of 𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴, remains below their 
threshold and achieves reimbursement (causing I to take a value of 1 rather than 0). If 𝑃2∗ < 𝑃𝐹, where 𝑃𝐹 is the manufacturer’s floor price, the lowest price the manufacturer is willing to 
provide the new product for, then the intervention is not launched in the jurisdiction governed 
by the HTA body. 
As discussed, the metric of greatest relevance to the company is the estimated NPV. For our 
analysis we make the simplifying assumption that the commercial decision as to whether to 
“stick” or “twist” are taken at the country level and that the NPV for that country is 
independent of the novel intervention’s reimbursement in other countries. 
The NPV for the strategy to “stick”, and therefore be reimbursed at the EJP the current 
evidence base supports is formally summarised below: 
                                             𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑆  =  ∑ (𝑉2,𝑠 × (𝑃2,𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑀)(1+𝑟)𝑘 − 𝐶𝑁,𝑆 (1+𝑟)𝑘)𝑘                                                              (3) 
Where 𝑉2,𝑠 is the anticipated volume of sales for the manufacturer’s intervention under 
strategy “stick” (where the subscript s denotes stick), CM are the marginal costs associated 
with each unit of the intervention sold, CN,S are the non-marginal costs associated with the 
stick strategy, r is the manufacturer’s discount rate and k is the year the revenue or costs are 
generated.   
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Estimating the Expected Commercial Value of Sample Information 
Equation (2) and (3) summarise the price and discounted cash flows that can be achieved by 
strategy “stick”, but what if the manufacturer wishes to consider the commercial impact of 
collecting more data (“twist”)? 
We cannot know with certainty the parameter values that will be supported by the new 
sample. Simulation methods do allow the manufacturer to characterise the data (X) that could 
plausibly arise from a trial of some specified follow up duration and number of patients. 
Suppose the manufacturer believes the HTA body is over-cautious in its assessment of the 
evidence base and therefore that the HTA body’s specification of the distribution for  𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴, is 
“conservative” - the manufacturer’s beliefs about 𝜃 may be less conservative, and we 
represent the parameters defined according to the manufacturer’s distribution as  𝜃𝑀.2 They 
would use their belief distribution when considering what plausible data from a new study 
would look like. To generate plausible data the manufacturer would sample from the 
sampling distribution of the data, conditional on 𝜃𝑀,  𝑋~𝑃(𝑋|𝜃𝑀). See Ades et al. for a 
general discussion on generating plausible trial data15.  
Any new data would be critically reviewed by the HTA body. New information could lead to 
a revision in the HTA body’s beliefs about the true underlying parameter values, and this 
would have consequences for the manufacturer’s EJP. By modifying equation (2) we can 
define the EJP for the “twist” strategy (demarcated using subscript t) as: 
   𝑃2,𝑡∗ |𝑋  =   𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃2,𝑡 [𝑃2,𝑡 × 𝐼 {𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴|𝑋 (𝜆𝑄2 − 𝐶2(𝑃2)) >  𝐸𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴|𝑋(𝜆𝑄1 − 𝐶1)}]              (4) 
                                                 
2 Again, strictly speaking, the manufacturer defines the distribution 𝑝𝑀(𝜃). We write  𝜃𝑀 as shorthand for 𝜃 that 
has distribution 𝑝𝑀(𝜃). 
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Similarly, by modifying equation (3) the expected NPV of the twist strategy can be defined 
as: 
                                       𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝑋)  =   {∑(𝑉2,𝑡 ∗ (𝑃2,𝑡∗ (𝑋)− 𝐶𝑀)(1+𝑟)𝑘  −   𝐶𝑁,𝑡 (1+𝑟)𝑘)}                                   (5) 
The expected NPV for the twist strategy is then 𝐸𝑥(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝑋)). The expected commercial value 
of sample information (ECVSI) is the difference between the expected net present value of 
strategy “twist” and the estimated net present value of strategy “stick”, more formally: 
                                                        𝐸𝐶𝑉𝑆𝐼 =  𝐸𝑥(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡) − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑠                                        (6) 
As previously discussed, within published literature, EVSI is typically presented in relation to 
the expected value to the payer rather than the manufacturer. Using a case study, we now 
illustrate how EVSI can be used in commercial practice. 
Case study 
Rationale for the case study  
We select a specific managed access process for the case study in order to make the approach 
more concrete and clearer. We choose the new CDF, which is integrated into the NICE 
process, because of: (i) the relative transparency of the process; and (ii) NICE’s reputation for 
technical rigour16. Figure 1 illustrates how the CDF fits within the NICE process for 
assessing oncology interventions. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
With oncology interventions it will commonly be the case that an important area of 
uncertainty concerns the longer-term extrapolation of observed survival benefit. With 
immune oncology therapies in particular, it will often be the case that there is: (i) a strong 
rationale for believing a proportion of the treated population will have an excellent long-term 
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prognosis; while (ii) having insufficient follow-up data at the time of initial assessment to 
demonstrate this. We anticipate that the additional data collected to reduce this uncertainty 
will often rely on continuing follow-up in the interventions’ ongoing pivotal study - a 
“hunch” that is supported by the high proportion of interventions covered by the CDF where 
this has been the case to date 18.  
Data available at initial NICE assessment 
We have used a hypothetical example for the illustrative case study. Figure 2 presents 
Kaplan-Meier’s (KMs) summarising the overall survival data available at the date of the 
initial NICE assessment. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
While the intervention’s KM curve is beginning to plateau towards the end of the initial 
follow-up period the (hypothetical) appraisal committee deemed the current evidence 
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a population of “long term survivors” (patients 
who are “cured”). When coming to a decision as to the ICER they judge most plausible, the 
committee decide to adopt an assumption they see as “conservative” - i.e. an extrapolation 
approach that does not assume a proportion of the treated population are long term survivors 
(and therefore chose the extrapolation based on the solid rather than the dotted red line in 
Figure 2). In order to obtain immediate reimbursement on baseline commissioning the 
manufacturer would need to give the treatment a price per vial justified by this conservative 
assumption (in our hypothetical case study the intervention is packaged in 50mg vials). 
Assuming this initial price is above the manufacturer’s floor price they are left with the 
decision as to whether to “stick” (accept immediate reimbursement) or “twist” (with the 
assumption that further data collection will demonstrate the existence of a population of 
“long term survivors”).  
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The manufacturer estimated the cost-effectiveness of the intervention using a three-state 
partitioned survival model, with health states for progression-free, progressed and death (as 
would typically be used for oncology interventions). Below we outline the ‘base case’ 
approach for this model. Parameters for the model are outlined in appendices 3 and 4; in 
appendix 5 we present the results of scenario analyses which explore the effect of varying 
important base case assumptions. 
As well as medication costs values for monitoring costs, adverse event costs, administration 
costs and utilities were included in the model. A sub-module to estimate the NPV and EJP of 
each strategy (stick or twist) via equations 2-5, and the ECVSI via equation 6, was added to 
the cost-effectiveness model. The sub-module included parameters for: (i) the manufacturer’s 
discount rate;  (ii) the incident population; (iii) each strategy’s market share over time 
(assumed in the base case to be equivalent for each strategy); (iv) the marginal costs per unit 
of intervention sold; (v) the fixed marketing costs; and (vi) of relevance only to the twist 
strategy, the cost of further data collection.  
Estimating the EJP and NPV of the ‘stick’ strategy. 
For the “stick” scenario, parametric survival models were fitted to the overall survival data 
available at the time of initial assessment by the (hypothetical) appraisal committee (i.e. 
models were fitted to the data presented in Figure 2 that did not assume a proportion of the 
population were long term survivors). For the intervention and comparator groups, log-
logistic models were selected (details presented in Appendix 1). These models were therefore 
used to define the survival parameters for 𝜃𝐻𝑇𝐴,𝑠 . In line with equation 2, the “stick” EJP was 
derived using the mean of 1,000 probabilistic sensitivity analysis iterations, in which 
parameters relating to patient characteristics, overall survival curve parameters, relative PFS 
efficacy, utility values and cost and resource use were varied within their distributions. The 
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resultant EJP was calculated by multiplying the incremental QALYs by the willingness-to-
pay (WTP) threshold (£30,000 was used for this case study), and then calculating the price 
required to match this value. Using equation 3 the NPV of the ‘stick’ strategy was estimated 
from the EJP. 
Estimating the EJP and NPV of the ‘twist’ strategy. 
In order to estimate the EJP and NPV of the ‘twist’ strategy it is first necessary to simulate 
plausible (to the manufacturer) datasets that a new study may generate, and then interpret 
how this additional sample information would be interpreted by the HTA body. Doing so 
requires three key steps to be followed: (1) determination of the manufacturer’s beliefs about 𝜃, which may be less conservative than the HTA body’s beliefs (i.e. to characterise 𝜃𝑀); (2) 
simulation of plausible future survival data, 𝑋, for the patients in the pre-existent study who 
are yet to experience an event (note because the trial is already underway there is a fixed 
number of these patients, and given the need to return to NICE for the final assessment, there 
is also a fixed period of time for additional follow-up); and (3) fitting of parametric mixture-
cure survival models (to represent the manufacturer’s belief that there is a proportion of 
patients who will be “cured”) to the “full” dataset comprising the observed data up to the time 
of appraisal, plus the simulated data from step (2)3. Steps ‘2’ and ‘3’ are then repeated for a 
sufficient number of iterations to characterise the manufacturer’s expectation of their NPV, 
conditional on the sampled data. An algorithm summarising the overall simulation approach 
for steps ‘1’ to ‘3’ is presented in Figure 3.  
                                                 
3 In a full Bayesian treatment we would compute the posterior distribution of the parameters, conditional on the 
follow up data simulated in step (2). This can be computationally challenging, so instead we generate an 
approximation to this posterior distribution by fitting (via maximum likelihood) a standard survival model to the 
“full” dataset comprising the observed data plus the data simulated in step (2). If the observed survival data 
represent our only information about the survival model parameters at the time of the appraisal (i.e. there is no 
other strong prior information), and if the posterior distribution of the survival model parameters is 
approximately Normal, then this approximation will be reasonable.  
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<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figure 4 shows the data observed at the initial assessment and for the intervention arm, for 
one simulation with and without assuming the treatment has a curative effect for some. In the 
base case we assume that there is a 75% chance that the intervention has a curative effect. In 
those simulations where it does have a curative effect we assume 75% of the patients yet to 
experience an event have a life expectancy equivalent to the general population (are “cured”). 
We vary the values of 𝜌 and 𝜋 from 75% in sensitivity analysis. 
<Figure 4 about here> 
A series of Weibull mixture-cure models were fitted to the combined observed and simulated 
data. The Weibull mixture-cure model was chosen as a suitable extrapolation technique for 
this hypothetical case study given: (i) its prior use in studies of immune oncology therapies; 
and (ii) the ability to directly account for the dichotomous population considered in this 
example20,21.  
Having simulated the expected sample information (𝑋) it is possible to use the cost-
effectiveness model to estimate the expected EJP for the twist strategy using the approach 
outlined in equation (4). For the comparator, distributions for efficacy parameters in the cost-
effectiveness model were derived from parametric curves fitted to the observed data shown in 
Figure 2. For the intervention mixture cure models were fitted to the simulated trial data. For 
each simulation, the estimated efficacy parameters were used to populate the cost-
effectiveness model and the EJP was calculated. As with the estimation of the ‘stick’ strategy 
the per simulation EJP was estimated using the justifiable price derived from the 1,000 PSA 
iterations undertaken for each of the 1,000 trial simulations. Doing so allows the HTA body’s 
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uncertainty that remains following further data collection to be accounted for in line with 
NICE’s preferred approach 22.  
Using equation 5 for the ‘stick’ strategy, the distribution of EJPs is generated, and from each 
EJP, a corresponding NPV is estimated. For realism, we assume a minimum price below 
which the company would not launch after the CDF (which we set at £300). Where the EJP 
resulting for a given simulation is below the floor price the NPV estimate only incorporates 
revenue over the first two years (as we assume the intervention is not reimbursed after this 
period). As noted above, the NPV estimate for the twist strategy incorporates an additional 
cost for data collection. In this hypothetical example we assume this to be £1,000,000, split 
equally across the two years. Because we draw from the distribution of EJPs per simulated 
trial we are able to estimate the probability that the additional data collection results in a 
sample that leads to a higher EJP, and therefore a higher NPV, than would result from 
pursuing the ‘stick’ strategy. 
Results: the expected commercial value of the sample information 
Table 1 summarises the anticipated commercial consequences of the pharmaceutical 
company deciding to either “Stick”) or “Twist”.   
<Table 1 about here> 
As shown in Table 1 the simulation exercise indicates that the decision to “Twist” would 
result in an estimated net financial benefit of £8,006,677. It is not only important to identify 
which strategy is most likely to generate the higher revenues but also assess risk. The 
probability that “twist” is the optimal strategy is higher than 75%, the prior expectation that a 
plateau would be demonstrated by the extended follow up data. This is a result of two factors 
in combination. Firstly, it is to be expected that the observed sample can either be more 
optimistic or pessimistic than the hypothesised value. Secondly, however, if we assume that a 
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proportion of patients are cured, this will always lead to more favourable outcomes on 
average, than an alternative “no cure” assumption. We may not see a lower EJP than for the 
“no cure” assumption in any simulation, even when there is sampling variability Therefore, 
combining these factors, a substantive proportion (13%) of the “no cure” samples support a 
higher price than justified in the “stick” base case as do all (100%) the “cure” samples.  
Figure 5 also illustrates that there is a high probability that further data collection will support 
a higher price, benefiting revenue. However, it additionally presents the consequences of a 
substantially negative outcome. 15% of simulations resulted in the EJP being below the floor 
price, leading to the drug not being reimbursed and a mean net loss of revenue of -£2,275,693 
for these samples. The area under the curve to the left or to the right of the y-axis illustrates 
the probability that the twist decision will be negative or positive, respectively. 
<Figure 5 about here> 
Prior to making a decision the manufacturer would likely wish to consider how the results 
would vary depending on the assumptions adopted. Some important areas of uncertainty to 
explore include: the extent to which the sales volume during the interim funding period 
would be worse than if the intervention was reimbursed via baseline commissioning; and the 
estimated probability that the intervention truly has a “curative” effect. Indeed, conditional 
upon the assumption of “curative effect” being validated it would also be important to 
explore: the estimated proportion of “long term survivors”; and the prognosis of these “long 
term survivors” relative to the age matched general population. Scenarios exploring these 
areas uncertainty are presented in appendix 4. 
Discussion 
EVSI provides a framework through which different facets of knowledge, held across a 
pharmaceutical company, can be formally integrated to estimate the commercial value of 
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collecting further information. It allows a considered, analytically grounded investigation of 
whether NICE’s (or another HTA body’s) “most plausible ICER” is likely to be sufficiently 
pessimistic to be worth challenging through further data collection. To the best of our 
knowledge, when considering whether to accept conditional reimbursement or lower the price 
to gain immediate approval, pharmaceutical companies currently lean heavily on the 
judgement of senior managers. Anecdotally it would seem that rarely, if ever, do they 
formally draw together all their cross-functional knowledge into one coherent analysis to 
quantify each option’s probability, risks and rewards. Borrowing from Culyer, we 
acknowledge that the role of the economist is not to determine the optimal course of action 
for the legitimate decision maker23. However, we do believe the analyst has a role to play in 
facilitating the decision makers coming to a more informed decision; particularly when there 
is considerable uncertainty regarding the data that will be accrued by further follow up, for 
example when the data at the time of initial submission is less mature than in our hypothetical 
case study. 
When a treatment is being assessed by an HTA body there are three very real options. The 
manufacturer can “stick”, “twist” or withdraw their application. When faced with both 
numerous organisational constraints and uncertainty about the outcomes that will emerge 
from continuing follow-up, it may be the case that managers will tend to make decisions 
which, while judicious for the individual’s interests, are suboptimal for either the company 
and society. Specifically, they may prefer to select the options with known consequences and 
therefore either: (i) accept a permanently lower price than would be supported by further 
follow-up data (of benefit to society but suboptimal for the company); or (ii) withdraw the 
intervention because the price the HTA body is currently willing to offer is below the floor 
price and they are less confident of the likely outcomes of the follow-up study than they 
could be (a decision that would be suboptimal for both society and the company). The 
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demands to meet senior managers’ or external investors’ requirements may at times make a 
detailed quantification of the benefits and risks of further data collection redundant. We do, 
however, believe there are many instances where the magnitude of the consequences 
involved justify the use of advanced analytics. 
This manuscript has focussed on an oncology case-study in a cost-effectiveness HTA context. 
We acknowledge it would be beneficial if future methods research worked to apply these 
simulation methods in a broader range of negotiation manufacturer/HTA negotiation 
contexts. 
Conclusion 
Changes in the wider drug development, regulatory and HTA context are leading to it being 
increasingly important to consider the value of collecting further information. Simulation 
methods, informed by the theoretical framework of EVSI, can facilitate pharmaceutical 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Cancer Drug’s Fund Managed Access Process 
 
Reference: Adapted from the NHS England Board paper February 2016, Appendix 217 
 
Figure 2: Extrapolation judged most plausible given data available at the initial assessment (hypothetical case study) 
 
Note: The dotted red line represents a mixture-cure model fitted to the KM data, whereas the solid red line represents an 
alternative standard parametric extrapolation. Shading indicates the 95% CI around the KM for each arm. 
 
Figure 3: Algorithm for estimating survival in “twist” scenario 
 
Figure 4:Schematic of the original observed data and one simulation with and without the cure assumption 
 












Appendix 1: Survival applied in “stick” scenario 
Six distributions were considered (exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, generalised gamma, log-
normal and log-logistic). The log-logistic provided a reasonable extrapolation for both 
treatment arms, and so this model was considered appropriate to apply in the cost-
effectiveness model base case in the “stick” scenario. An overview of these models is 
provided in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Survival models applied in “stick” scenario  
Appendix 2: Parameters incorporated in the cost-effectiveness model 
 
Appendix 3: Parameters incorporated in the eNPV submodule 
 
Appendix 4: Results of the exploratory scenarios 
Note that for each scenario where a different assumption is made for the time to event data 
each of the parameters are also re-simulated (two of the columns in the table below draw 
attention to the differing simulated values for two of these parameters below).  
 
